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I. PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Respondent, Utah State Tax Commission, respectfully 
petitions the Utah Court of Appeals for rehearing with respect to 
the Court's decision, dated January 29, 1993, in the above 
referenced matter. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Petitioner and Appellant, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
("Chevron") appealed a decision of the Utah State Tax Commission 
centrally assessing Chevron's refinery for 1989 property taxes 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201 (1987) (amended). Chevron 
contended that the Tax Commission misinterpreted language in § 
59-2-201 permitting central assessment of "property and surface 
improvements appurtenant to mines", to include Chevron's Salt 
Lake City refinery. Chevron also contends that the Tax 
Commission misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201(1) (a) to 
permit central assessment of its refinery, where the refinery 
operates as a unit across county lines. Finally, Chevron 
contended that the Tax Commission unconstitutionally failed to 
grant Chevron a 20% reduction unavailable to locally assessed 
properties pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-304 (Supp. 1989) 
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(repealed). This court reversed the Tax Commission's 
jurisdictional determination. 
The Tax Commission petitions the Court for rehearing 
solely with respect to the Court's reversal of the Commission's 
decision that Chevron's refinery should be centrally assessed, 
pursuant to the provisions of § 59-2-201(1)(a). 
Specifically, the Tax Commission found below, in 
Finding of Fact 3, that the Petitioner operates an oil refinery 
facility located in both Salt Lake and Davis counties. Also, in 
its Conclusions of Law, the Tax Commission found that the Chevron 
refinery should be assessed by the Commission because it operated 
as a unit across county lines, and because the values must be 
apportioned among more than one county. 
The Commission further determined in its Decision and 
Order, 
At the outset, the Commission finds that 
the Petitioner's refinery is properly 
centrally assessed on the grounds that it 
operates as a unit across county lines as 
mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201(1)(a). 
The facts are not in dispute that a portion, 
albeit a small portion, of the refinery 
crosses into Davis County from Salt Lake 
County. Given that fact, and the fact that § 
59-2-201(1)(a) makes no distinction regarding 
the degree to which a property crosses a 
county line, the conditions for central 
assessment are clearly met. 
Decision and Order pp. 3-4. 
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This Court, by finding that the jurisdictional grounds 
for central assessment were not met, did not reach the 
constitutional question. The Tax Commission is seeking a review 
of this Court's decision only with reference to assessment 
jurisdiction of Chevron's refinery as the record clearly supports 
the Commission's finding that the property crosses county lines, 
and that its value is apportioned among two or more counties. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Evidentiary Basis 
The Court should have affirmed the Commission's 
decision that the Chevron refinery should be centrally assessed 
in accordance with § 59-2-201(1)(a). In its decision, this Court 
found as follows: 
Chevron correctly complains that the Division did 
not indicate in its initial determination that the 
refinery was being centrally assessed under sub-section 
(a). Nor did it raise the applicability of sub-section 
(a) in it's briefs or arguments before the Commission. 
Consequently, Chevron was not aware of the Commission's 
intent to apply sub-section (a) until it's ruling 
appeared in the final decision. Chevron, therefore did 
not have any opportunity before the Commission to 
present evidence regarding sub-section (a), or to argue 
its proper interpretation. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.; and Amoco Oil Company, v. Utah State Tax 
Commission; Davis County; and Salt Lake County, Case No. 920546-
CA, Slip Opinion January 29, 1993. 
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The Court stated that the Commission had raised this 
issue sua sponte and quoted two decisions to support its 
determination. The Court said "only passing reference was made 
to the refinery's location by Chevron's property tax 
representative, Chris Chambers, in response to a question by 
Chevron's legal counsel during the formal hearing." The Court 
then quoted a colloquy between Chevron's counsel and Mr, 
Chambers, wherein Chambers admitted that the property was located 
in Davis and Salt Lake counties. Chevron Transcript at pp. 8-9. 
This Court stated that this was the full extent of evidence 
relating to the location of the refinery and the manner in which 
it crossed county lines. 
It is worth noting that Chevron did not contest the 
Commission's factual finding as to the cross county line 
operation as it was well aware that the record was clear that the 
refinery was located in two counties. Chevron challenged only 
the Commission's interpretation of § 59-2-201. It is clear from 
the briefs in that Chevron performed no marshalling of the facts 
which would support the Commission's position. It did not do so, 
because the Tax Commission's factual finding was unchallenged. 
This Court's misunderstanding of the facts ignores the 
testimony of John Stewart, the Natural Resource Manager for the 
Property Tax Division, as well as counsels' closing arguments. 
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It should be noted that the testimony of Mr. Stewart below was to 
be considered for both the Chevron and Amoco cases. Amoco 
Transcript at p. 3 and p. 59. 
This Court may have been unaware that the testimony of 
Mr. Stewart as to Chevron and the closing arguments of counsel as 
to both Chevron and Amoco were contained in the Amoco transcript. 
Amoco Transcript p. 3, lines 11-20 reads as follows: 
THE COURT: Back on the record of Chevron 
U.S.A. in case No. 89-0826. In speaking with 
the parties during the recess it is my 
understanding, correct me if I am wrong, the 
Chevron case, and the Amoco case will not 
consolidated, and a separate hearing will be 
heard for each case. At this point, Mr. 
Tarbet, we were about to have you put on Mr. 
Stewart and to allow him to testify at the 
end of the Amoco case; is that correct? 
MR. TARBET: That is correct. Mr. Stewart's 
testimony will be responsive to both cases, 
and counsel and I have agreed that John can 
follow the presentation of the Amoco case. 
MR. LEWIS: That's correct, and we will also 
propose that there be one argument at the end 
of the Amoco case instead of two arguments. 
THE COURT: One set of closing remarks; is 
that correct? 
MR. LEWIS: Right. 
Amoco Transcript p. 59, lines 15-21 reads as follows: 
MR. TARBET: I would like to call John 
Stewart to address both of the hearings. 
THE COURT: The record should reflect that 
John Stewart is being called and also his 
testimony will be considered for the prior 
case, the Chevron case, as well as the Amoco 
case. 
MR. LEWIS: That is agreeable. I would like 
to move the admission of Exhibit 3, 4, and 5. 
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In response to a question posed to Mr. Stewart by 
counsel for the Property Tax Division, he stated that the 
property was indeed located in two counties and should be subject 
to assessment under § 59-2-201(1). Amoco Transcript p. 69, line 
3 to p. 70, line 20 reads as follows: 
MR. TARBET: One final question, in review of 
59-2-201, do you feel that both of these 
petitioners should be subject to central 
assessment? 
MR. STEWART: Yes. 
MR. TARBET: Why is that? 
MR. STEWART: I feel there are two parts, 
they were primarily processing their own 
material, and according to the statute there 
they should be locally assessed for that. 
MR. TARBET: I'm going to ask you a question 
about 59-2-201(1)(a) which pertains to only 
one of these petitioners, that being Chevron, 
The code states that all property which 
operates as a unit across the county line, 
again, this is defining who is subject to 
central assessment. All property which 
operates as a unit across the county line, 
the values must be portioned among more than 
one county or state; do we have that 
situation in the Chevron context? 
MR. STEWART: Yes. 
MR. TARBET: Why is that? 
MR. STEWART: They border Salt Lake County 
and Davis County lines. 
MR. TARBET: What do you mean by border? 
Where does that refinery sit? 
MR. STEWART: The refinery sits on top of the 
county line between Salt Lake and Davis. 
MR. TARBET: So, it would be your testimony 
that Chevron Refinery would be subject to 
central assessment under sub paragraph A, or 
sub paragraph D of 59-2-201(1)? 
MR. STEWART: Yes. 
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Furthermore, after Mr. Stewart had been questioned by 
both counsel for the Property Tax Division and Chevron, a 
question was posed by Mr. Paul F. Iwasaki, the Administrative Law 
Judge conducting the hearing. In response to the Court's 
question, it was again affirmed that the refinery was located in 
both Salt Lake and Davis County and thus squarely within the 
embrace of subsection 59-2-201(1). Amoco Transcript p.103, lines 
4-18 reads as follows: 
THE COURT: Mr. Stewart, with regards to your 
testimony, you testified that you thought 
that the Chevron Refinery, and the previous 
case would come under, subsection 59-2-201, 
that would be with the county line; is that 
correct? 
MR. STEWART: Yes, that would be a second 
test to see if it could be state assessed. 
THE COURT: Does Chevron Refinery go across 
the county line? 
MR. STEWART: The property borders right on 
the county line. 
THE COURT: And was it assessed prior to 1989 
by Salt Lake and another county? 
MR. STEWART: Salt Lake and Davis assessed 
the property, if that's my understanding. 
Furthermore, this Court stated that the jurisdictional 
question of multiple county operations was not argued below. 
This point was argued to the Commission both by counsel for the 
Property Tax Division in his final argument to the Commission and 
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by counsel for Chevron. Amoco Transcript p. 116, lines 
reads as follows: 
COUNSEL FOR PROPERTY TAX DIVISION: Let me 
deal with Chevron. The whole issue here 
comes down to any or some of the provisions 
apply to Chevron to the extent that it should 
be centrally assessed. We have pointed out 
here today on testimony received that in case 
of Chevron this is a taxpayer, which does 
business in two counties, operates across 
state lines. It seems clear that it comes 
within the embrace sub section 1(a) of 59-2-
201. 
Amoco Transcript p. 126, line 9 to p. 127, line 6 reads 
follows: 
COUNSEL FOR CHEVRON: Finally, with regard to 
the issue of the taxpayer Chevron, doing 
business in two counties. That statute, that 
portion in the statute which by the way that 
issue is raised for the very first time 
today, they never heard of it before. The 
reason it hasn't been raised before is 
because it is not applicable. That section 
1(a) of this statute says, all property which 
operates as a unit across county lines if the 
values must be portioned among more than one 
county or state, this portion of the statute 
is dealing generally with railroad properties 
and the like, that are truly operated as a 
unit and cannot be individually valued by 
county. You don't value ten miles of 
railroad track in Juab county, and then ten 
miles or 20 miles in Millard County. The way 
you look at it is as a whole. 
That isn't the case with the Chevron 
Refinery. You have one very small portion, I 
believe it's actually part of the intake 
pipeline that is in Salt Lake County. All 
the rest is in Davis County. The reason that 
Chevron has not been centrally assessed under 
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section 1(a) which has been in existence for 
many years, is because the Tax Commission has 
realized that that is not applicable to the 
Chevron situation. Otherwise Chevron would 
have been centrally assessed for the past 
many years. Thank you. 
The fact that the Chevron property was located in both 
Davis and Salt Lake Counties and operated across county lines, is 
abundantly clear from two witness, questioned by three 
interrogators during the hearing before the Tax Commission. 
To suggest that this point was not argued before the 
Tax Commission and thus could not be raised by the Tax Commission 
on appeal ignores the record. 
B. CASE LAW 
Further, the cases quoted by the Court to support its 
position are inapposite. In Combe v. Warrenfs Family Drive-Inns, 
Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984), the Supreme Court cited with 
approval a case that held that findings which are at variance 
with the claims of both parties are not favored and are carefully 
scrutinized on review. West v. West, 16 Utah 2d 411, 403 P.2d 22 
(1965) . 
In Combe, the Supreme Court further quoted Utah R. Civ. 
P. 54(c)(1) which permits relief on grounds not pleaded, arguing 
that the rule does not go so far as to authorize the granting of 
relief on issues neither raised nor tried. Cornia v. Cornia, 546 
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P.2d 890 (Utah 1976). The Court then argued that the trial court 
fashioned its finding from whole cloth. 
In this case, it is clear that the jurisdictional point 
was exhaustively established below that the refinery operated in 
both Salt Lake and Davis Counties. Two witnesses offered 
testimony, the Tax Commission made a specific finding, and there 
was a specific conclusion of law addressing this point. The 
majority of the hearing below involved the jurisdictional 
question. 
The fact is that Mr. Chamber's testimony alerted the 
Property Tax Division to an additional basis for jurisdiction. 
This point was then aggressively argued before the Tax Commission 
and was it clearly within the Tax Commission's purview to issue a 
ruling. To hold otherwise would be an distortion of judicial 
economy and a waste of resources. 
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983) cited by 
this Court is likewise not on point. In the Girard case it was 
argued: 
In the instant case, we are not apprised 
of the reason Girard saw fit to rest her case 
without presenting evidence in support of her 
claim for attorneys fees. However, even if 
it can be assumed that it was the result of 
oversight, the interests of justice are not 
enhanced when the court exceeds it's role as 
arbiter by reaching out and deciding an issue 
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that would otherwise be dead, it not having been 
litigated at the time of trial. 
Id. at 247. 
In both Warren and Girard, there was a sua sponte 
ruling by the court. In present case, there was both evidence 
and argument at the plenary hearing to support the Tax 
Commission's Finding and Conclusions. Neither case cited by this 
Court is relevant. 
It should be noted that the burden of proof in hearings 
before the Tax Commission rests with the Petitioner. Utah State 
Tax Commission Rule R861-1-7A.G states: 
G. Burden of Proof. The petitioning 
party shall have the burden of proof to 
establish that his petition should be 
granted. 
It is clear from the record that the evidence 
established that the refinery was located in both Salt Lake and 
Davis Counties. Counsel for Chevron, in his closing argument to 
the Commission, noted that the property in Salt Lake County 
consisted of intake pipelines. Testimony established that the 
value of the refinery would be apportioned to both counties. 
Chevron offered no evidence to detract from this jurisdictional 
basis, and in fact offered much of the evidence in support of 
such a jurisdictional finding. The record supports both the 
Commission's Finding and Conclusions. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Tax Commission respectfully 
requests that the Court grant its Petition for Rehearing- The 
Tax Commission seeks to clearly establish that the Chevron 
refinery was properly centrally assessed and that the additional 
constitutional issue needs to be dealt with by this Court. 
Should the Court desire oral argument or additional written 
briefs, the Tax Commission would be pleased to provide the same. 
CERTIFICATION 
The undersigned certifies that the Petition for 
Rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
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/^Mfc 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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